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FRAUD—RELIANCE—FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET THEORY MAY NOT 
SATISFY RELIANCE REQUIREMENT IN CLAIMS OF COMMON LAW FRAUD 
OR NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION—Kaufman v. I-Stat Corp., 165 N.J. 
94, 754 A.2d 1188 (2000). 
The defendant, i-Stat Corporation (i-Stat), allegedly overstated the 
sales and demand of its products in public announcements.  Kaufman v. I-
Stat Corp., 165 N.J. 94, 98-99, 754 A.2d 1188, 1190 (2000).  i-Stat, a 
publicly traded corporation, experienced a decline in its stock value and 
heavy trading after its sales procedures were discovered and publicized. 
The plaintiff, Susan Kaufman, who brought suit on behalf of a 
putative class, was a shareholder of i-Stat during the alleged period of 
misrepresentation.  Id. at 99, 754 A.2d at 1190.  When purchasing her 
stock, Ms. Kaufman relied solely on the market price of i-Stat, and not on i-
Stat’s misrepresentations.  Id. at 100, 754 A.2d at 1191.  Ms. Kaufman 
brought suit against i-Stat, and other named defendants, alleging, among 
other things, common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation.  Id., 754 
A.2d at 1190.  Ms. Kaufman claimed i-Stat’s misrepresentations of its sales 
inflated its stock price during the named period.  Because Ms. Kaufman did 
not rely on any alleged misrepresentations of i-Stat when purchasing her 
stock, the plaintiff depended upon the fraud-on-the-market theory to satisfy 
the reliance element of common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation.  
Id., 754 A.2d at 1191.  The fraud-on-the-market theory creates a rebuttable 
presumption of reliance based upon an efficient market’s incorporation of 
misrepresentations and omissions into a stock’s price.  Id. at 97, 101, 754 
A.2d at 1189, 1191 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)). 
The Superior Court, Law Division, granted summary judgment in 
favor of i-Stat, holding that the fraud-on-the-market theory may not satisfy 
reliance in claims of common law fraud or negligent misrepresentation 
under New Jersey law.  Id. at 100, 754 A.2d at 1191.  The appellate 
division affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint regarding 
negligent misrepresentation, but reversed the dismissal of the common law 
fraud claim.  Id.  The appellate division reasoned that the fraud-on-the-
market theory could satisfy the reliance element of a common law fraud 
claim, but not a claim of negligent misrepresentation.  Id. at 101, 754 A.2d 
at 1191. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to determine 
whether the fraud-on-the-market theory may satisfy the reliance element of 
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common law fraud.  Id. at 103, 754 A.2d at 1192.  Justice LaVecchia, 
writing for a majority of four justices, held that the fraud-on-the-market 
theory does not satisfy the reliance element of common law fraud or 
negligent misrepresentation.  Id. at 118, 754 A.2d at 1201. 
The majority began the analysis with a discussion of the relevant 
federal security laws, noting that Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 prohibits defendant’s alleged acts and entitles plaintiff to 
damages.  Id. at 103, 754 A.2d at 1192-93.  The court observed, however, 
that the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA) and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 
(SLUSA) has restricted a plaintiff’s ability to recover.  Id. at 104, 754 A.2d 
at 1193.  Justice LaVecchia noted that the PSLRA imposes several 
restrictions upon a plaintiff alleging claims under the federal securities 
laws.  Id. at 104, 754 A.2d at 1193.  The majority explained that plaintiffs 
have been filing weaker securities claims in state courts to avoid the 
strictures of the PSLRA.  Id. at 105, 754 A.2d at 1193.  The court observed 
that upon the filing of these substitute Rule 10b-5 actions under state law, 
plaintiffs attempt to have the presiding court incorporate the fraud-on-the-
market theory into that state’s common law.  Id. 
Justice LaVecchia asserted that Congress enacted the SLUSA in 
response to the circumvention of the PSLRA through substitute state law 
claims.  Id. at 106, 754 A.2d at 1194.  The court clarified that the SLUSA 
restricts the ability of plaintiffs to bring federal securities actions in state 
courts.  Id. at 107, 754 A.2d at 1194.  The majority cautioned, however, 
that excepted plaintiffs under the SLUSA can still bring substitute Rule 
10b-5 actions in state court.  Id.  Justice LaVecchia forewarned that if New 
Jersey incorporated the fraud-on-the-market theory into its common law, 
these excepted plaintiffs could forum shop, bringing substitute Rule 10b-5 
actions under New Jersey common law.  Id. 
The court next analyzed the current reliance requirement under 
common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation.  Id. at 108-11, 754 
A.2d at 1195-97.  Justice LaVecchia noted that the reliance requirement is 
the same under claims of common law fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation.  Id. at 109, 754 A.2d at 1195.  The court articulated that 
proof of indirect reliance will satisfy the reliance element of both claims.  
Id.  The majority asserted that indirect reliance allows a plaintiff to satisfy 
the reliance requirement when the plaintiff heard and relied upon 
misstatements from a defendant’s agent or a third party.  Id. at 108, 754 
A.2d at 1195.  The court stressed that, when proving indirect reliance, the 
plaintiff must actually receive and consider the misstatements or omissions.  
Id. at 109, 754 A.2d at 1195.  Accordingly, the majority concluded that the 
fraud-on-the-market theory, which allows a plaintiff to prove reliance 
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without showing actual receipt and consideration of the misrepresentations 
or omissions, contravenes and weakens the current indirect reliance 
requirement.  Id. at 118, 754 A.2d at 1200-01.  Because the plaintiff here 
admittedly did not rely on the alleged misstatements of i-Stat, the court 
held that the plaintiff did not sufficiently show a claim for fraud.  Id. at 
111, 754 A.2d at 1197. 
Justice LaVecchia also found persuasive the analysis of indirect 
reliance and the fraud-on-the-market theory’s applicability to state claims 
undertaken by courts in other jurisdictions.  Id. at 106, 110-11, 754 A.2d at 
1194, 1196.  The majority identified three other courts that require actual 
reliance on the misrepresentations under a theory of indirect reliance: the 
Florida District Court of Appeals, the California Court of Appeals, and the 
California Supreme Court.  Id. at 110-11, 754 A.2d at 1196 (citations and 
quotation omitted).  Justice LaVecchia also asserted that no state court has 
accepted a fraud-on-the-market theory, outside of dictum, under state law.  
Id. at 113, 754 A.2d at 1198.  The majority further noted that the United 
States District Court of New Jersey, and other federal courts with 
jurisdiction in New Jersey, have declined to accept the fraud-on-the-market 
theory under state law.  Id. at 106, 754 A.2d at 1194. 
In addition to the persuasive analysis of other courts, the majority 
considered the Uniform Securities Law (USL), New Jersey’s statutory 
securities law, in rejecting the fraud-on-the-market theory.  Id. at 112-13, 
754 A.2d at 1197-98.  The court explained that the USL does not require 
securities-fraud plaintiffs to prove reliance on any misrepresentation or 
omission.  Id. at 112, 754 A.2d at 1197.  Justice LaVecchia emphasized, 
however, that the USL requires privity in securities-fraud actions.  Id.  The 
court observed that the privity requirement was not met in this case.  Id.  As 
a result, Justice LaVecchia propounded that permitting the fraud-on-the-
market theory to establish reliance in this case would allow the plaintiff to 
avoid the New Jersey Legislature’s securities-fraud requirements and 
policy decisions as articulated by the USL.  Id. at 112-13, 754 A.2d at 
1197-98. 
Finally, Justice LaVecchia questioned the economic validity of the 
fraud-on-the-market theory.  Id. at 113-18, 754 A.2d at 1198-1201.  The 
court examined at length the academic, professional, and judicial criticism 
of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, the economic theory 
underlying the fraud-on-the-market theory.  Id.  The majority noted its 
reluctance to extend a theory used in the carefully balanced system of 
federal securities laws—the economic validity of which is strongly 
questioned—into the broad world of common law fraud.  Id. at 116-17, 754 
A.2d at 1200.  Justice LaVecchia observed that adopting the fraud-on-the-
market theory for claims of common law fraud would allow future 
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plaintiffs to satisfy reliance by claiming efficient markets exist in areas 
outside of securities.  Id.  The majority warned that the movement of such a 
specialized doctrine into the common law context, which has a more 
general application, would be dangerous.  Id. at 118, 754 A.2d at 1200.  
Justice LaVecchia also noted that the acceptance of the fraud-on-the-
market theory in a common law securities claim is especially unwarranted 
because an adequate federal remedy was available to the plaintiff.  Id. 
Justice Stein, in an opinion joined by Justice O’Hern and Justice 
Long, dissented from the majority’s opinion.  Id. at 119, 754 A.2d at 1201 
(Stein, J., dissenting).  Justice Stein, agreeing with the appellate division’s 
analysis, argued that the fraud-on-the-market theory should be capable of 
satisfying the reliance element of a common law fraud claim.  Id. 
The dissent analyzed the concept of indirect reliance and the United 
States Supreme Court’s treatment and definition of the fraud-on-the-market 
theory within a federal securities-fraud context, and challenged the 
majority’s determination regarding plaintiff’s failure to prove indirect 
reliance.  Id. at 120-25, 754 A.2d at 1201-04 (Stein, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Stein asserted that the principles of indirect reliance apply to publicly 
traded securities where a fraud is made on the public as a whole.  Id. at 120, 
754 A.2d at 1201-02 (Stein, J., dissenting). 
Furthermore, the dissent propounded that indirect reliance only 
requires a misrepresentation, with the intention that it will be 
communicated to third parties for the purpose of inducing reliance upon 
said misrepresentation.  Id., 754 A.2d at 1201 (Stein, J., dissenting).  
Justice Stein opined that the stock market itself conveys information to the 
plaintiff.  Id.  Consequently, the dissent concluded that i-Stat conveyed its 
misrepresentations to the plaintiff through i-Stat’s stock price.  Id.  Justice 
Stein further asserted that the United States Supreme Court’s analysis of 
the fraud-on-the-market theory in federal securities law claims applies 
equally to claims of common law fraud.  Id. at 123, 754 A.2d at 1203 
(Stein, J., dissenting).  The dissent argued that the reliance element of 
common law fraud is almost identical to that of a federal securities law 
claim.  Id. 
Justice Stein also chastised the majority’s discussion of the economic 
theory underlying the fraud-on-the-market theory.  Id. at 124, 754 A.2d at 
1204 (Stein, J., dissenting).  The dissent opined that the court need not 
accept the efficient market hypothesis underlying the fraud-on-the-market 
theory.  Id.  The dissent argued instead that the court must only accept the 
right of investors to assume that misrepresentations or omissions have not 
affected stock prices.  Id. 
Moreover, the dissent commented that the existence and strictures of 
federal securities claims should not favor rejecting an application of the 
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fraud-on-the-market theory under common law fraud.  Id. at 125, 754 A.2d 
at 1204 (Stein, J., dissenting).  Justice Stein justified this position by stating 
that Congress intended the federal securities laws to supplement, not 
preempt, state law.  Id.  Lastly, Justice Stein criticized the majority’s fear of 
future common law securities-fraud claims, observing that the PSLRA and 
the SLUSA restrict the access to state courts by most securities claim 
plaintiffs.  Id. at 126-27, 754 A.2d at 1205 (Stein, J., dissenting).  The 
dissent insisted that those plaintiffs exempted from federal restrictions 
should receive the full benefit of the fraud-on-the-market theory in their 
state securities claims.  Id. 
Civil securities-fraud claims are often vexatious, driven by attorney’s 
fees and coercive settlement negotiations.  This reality of securities-fraud 
litigation is balanced against a desire to provide legitimate relief for 
plaintiffs through both federal and state securities laws.  Whatever place 
the fraud-on-the-market theory has in the balance of statutory securities-
fraud, no place exists for it in common law actions.  The majority, in a 
well-reasoned opinion, prevents plaintiffs from circumventing the 
procedural barriers of well balanced federal and state securities laws 
through substitute common law actions. 
Shrewd plaintiffs undoubtedly would seek to take advantage of the 
fraud-on-the-market theory’s relaxed reliance requirements in the broader 
range of issues that common law fraud reaches.  For example, plaintiffs 
have already sought to apply the fraud-on-the-market theory to consumer 
fraud and malpractice claims.  Id. at 117, 754 A.2d at 1200 (citations 
omitted).  As the majority noted, one plaintiff has gone so far as to claim 
that basketball season ticket holders were defrauded, under the fraud-on-
the-market theory, when an athlete was traded to another team.  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Extending the reliance element of common law fraud would 
open up a Pandora’s box of debate over what constitutes a market.  Such an 
endless dispute would waste New Jersey courts’ time and resources, with 
no corresponding benefit. 
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